ABSTRACT
This chapter examines divergent trajectories of small-state bargaining strategies and their clash with key premises of EU decision-making on the example of the veto players’ positioning of several small states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE): Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, and their ad hoc coalitions. The purpose of the study is to evaluate the effectiveness of small-state behaviour from the perspective of the EU shelter model. The policy relevance of the member states from CEE has oscillated between that of free riders and veto players in proportions not typical of the region, conventionally regarded as an example of Europeanization and shelter-seeking behaviour dependent on the resources of European integration. The chapter regards veto politics as a puzzle for the workings of shelter theory. How do veto rights feature in the negotiation strategies of the small states? How effective is small-state veto power in influencing EU negotiation outcomes? What are the implications of veto politics for the model of bargaining and decision-making in the EU that relies on multiple coalitions across the East/West divide? The chapter traces the evolution of small-state veto power in the context of the 2015 refugee crisis, the 2021–2027 Multi-Annual Financial Framework and the structuring of EU emergency funding and the discussions on the negotiating framework for the EU accession of the Republic of North Macedonia.
