ABSTRACT
This chapter challenges the prevailing view that modern science inherently promotes democracy, while religious traditions necessarily hinder it. I critically examine the theory that democracy is rooted in emancipative values—such as individual autonomy, equality, and freedom of choice—and that science serves as both a product and a catalyst of these values, whereas religion perpetuates autocratic ones—such as authority, tradition, hierarchy. I argue that this framework oversimplifies the relationship between democracy, science, and religion by overlooking the role of value judgments in democratic will formation. Value judgments are deliberative decisions that are informed by values and are often meant to resolve conflicts among values. Democratic decision-making is shaped not only by emancipative values but also by deeper ethical and religious commitments, and science alone cannot supply the full range of value judgments required for democratic will formation. Excluding religious traditions would risk impoverishing the normative resources of democracy itself. This calls into question the rigid opposition between science and religion in terms of their democratic potential. I will argue that the liberal state has compelling reasons to engage with and cultivate religious traditions as a resource for democracy, rather than viewing them as obstacles to it.
Readers may be interested in these Handbook chapters as well: Hannah Hilligardt and Torsten Wilholt, “Science and Democracy”; Tarun Menon and Jacob Stegenga, “Democracy, Consensus, and the Value-Free Ideal.”
