ABSTRACT
After the 1962 war, China has emphasized maintaining stability in its border dispute with India. China's approach to military strategy distinguishes between primary and secondary strategic directions to prioritize the threats it faces. The southwest, or China's dispute with India, is viewed as a secondary strategic direction and thus not a primary focus of China's strategy. Maintaining stability on the border thus allows the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to concentrate forces against the greatest threat in the primary strategic direction. The chapter traces how this logic shaped China's actions during key episodes—the 1962 war, the 1967 Nathu La clash, the 1986 Sumdurong Chu crisis, the 1993 Peace and Tranquility Agreement, recurring border transgressions in the 2000s, and the 2017 Doklam stand-off—culminating in the deadly Galwan confrontation. It concludes that China's behavior reflects a pattern of using force or pressure to restore stability when it perceives Indian challenges, while avoiding full-scale escalation that might distract from its main strategic priority.
