ABSTRACT
Globalization has yielded uneven outcomes for large late developers. China and India—sharing civilizational depth and continental scale—first converged on Soviet-style planning after independence, then diverged from the 1980s to 2000s as China embraced export-led industrialization while India liberalized more gradually. Over the past decade, they have reconverged around assertive techno-nationalism in renewables, digital infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing. This convergence is competitive: both states translate geopolitics into industrial revival while leveraging domestic capabilities for global status. The chapter traces India's “becoming more like China” through three mechanisms: heightened nationalist rhetoric, revived industrial policy, and strategic courting of Western technology, capital, and markets amid US-led “de-risking.” It then assesses whether India can realistically catch up while skirmishing with China and constraining cross-border exchanges. Using sectoral evidence from electric vehicles (EVs), solar, and digital ecosystems, the analysis identifies opportunities and binding constraints. The chapter concludes that competitive convergence will persist, but the speed and scope of India's rise will hinge on institutional execution, regional security dynamics, and the ability to convert geopolitical alignment into durable industrial capabilities.
