ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that Japan's habit of seeing India through the prism of China determines the way and timing of Japan's endeavor to make India an Asian partner. In the first part, the rise and demise of Japan's expectations toward India in the 1950s and 1960s are reviewed. The Bandung Conference of 1955 revealed the gap between Japan's low-key approach focused on economic diplomacy and India's speaking up on behalf of non-alignment and the Five Principles. After the India–China War of 1962, Japan definitely swung to China for the sake of a trade agreement. In the second part, India's re-entry into East Asia in the 1990s and 2000s is examined. Japan felt uneasy about its eroding leadership role in regional institutions superseded by a rising China; hence, it negotiated hard for India's membership in the East Asia Summit (EAS). In the last part, the current state of the Japan–India–China configuration is seen from the perspective of economic statecraft. The rare earth shock in 2010 and later COVID-19 alerted India and Japan to their growing dependence on China. Japanese business is gradually diversifying its investments from China to India. Japan and India are working bilaterally and in the Quad for economic security. For a long time, the Japanese habit of holding on to its China strategic prism intertwined with strong Sino-Japanese economic ties hindered Japan from engaging India. But now the wheel is spinning back toward deepening engagement with India.
