ABSTRACT
The aim of this chapter is to reconstruct and defend the program of Inductive Metaphysics. For this purpose, we will reconsider the critique of metaphysics by the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle and the more moderate critique of metaphysics by the logical empiricists of the Berlin Group. Finally, we will briefly look at contemporary programs of science-driven metaphysics and compare them to Inductive Metaphysics. In the course of this investigation, we will show, inter alia: Inductive Metaphysics was well-known in the Vienna Circle and in the Berlin Group. While the major logical positivists of the Vienna Circle rejected the program of Inductive Metaphysics, the program of the logical empiricists of the Berlin Group is compatible with, in some cases even congenial to, the program of Inductive Metaphysics. Contemporary programs of so-called naturalized metaphysics are compatible with, if not identical to, the program of Inductive Metaphysics.
