ABSTRACT
Logical abductivism is the view that rational theory choice in logic occurs through an abductive method: our justification for accepting a logical theory relies on whether that theory outperforms alternative theories on some relevant criteria. This contribution examines the core principles of logical abductivism, focusing on some core abductive criteria and their role in theory choice (Sections 6.1 and 6.2). Section 6.3 explores the limitations of logical abductivism through the contrasting applications of it by two philosophers, Graham Priest, and Timothy Williamson. Using broadly the same abductive method, they arrive at divergent conclusions: Priest endorses a paraconsistent logic, while Williamson endorses classical logic. It is argued that this divergence stems primarily from differing views on the nature of logical data and their underlying metaphysical commitments. This highlights a key limitation of abductivism: its dependence on extralogical assumptions, making it non-neutral in guiding logical theory choice. Section 6.4 deals with two epistemological challenges to logical abductivism: the Adoption Problem, which questions whether certain basic logical principles can be adopted, and the Background Logic Problem, which highlights the circularity in revising fundamental logical principles while relying on them for such revisions. Section 6.5 concludes the contribution by discussing prospects for logical abductivism.
