ABSTRACT
In this chapter, an attempt is made to show that certain weaknesses in the justification of normative ethics by Immanuel Kant and Alan Gewirth can be overcome by combining the respective strengths of their approaches. A guiding thread for this approach is the possibility of (a theory of) freestanding instrumental reason (as developed by Kant), which challenges Gewirth's theory. Combining the justificatory theories of Kant and Gewirth allows us to improve the foundations of a rights-based moral theory. In the second step, important implications of the theory are outlined. The rights of people are not all on the same level but form a hierarchy. They are not only negative rights, i.e. rights to the forbearance of others, but also positive rights, i.e. rights to the assistance of others, if certain conditions are fulfilled. The rights of people must be effectively protected. It is outlined that standardly, the rights of others are to be approached from the internal perspective of an agent's own rights, but that in certain situations, agents must approach the rights of others from an external perspective. Finally, it is shown that rights-based ethics can provide the criteria for distinguishing between justified and unjustified risk impositions.
