ABSTRACT
In recent times, several authors have proposed to understand the dignity of human beings as a (social or moral) status rather than as an (absolute) inner value. One reason for this is that an inner value seems to be a strange “metaphysical” entity that can only be justified, if at all, based on dubious value naturalist assumptions. In contrast, this chapter argues that the “status” of human dignity must be based on the absolute inner value of human beings and that the justification of such a value does not presuppose value naturalism or any appeal to questionable metaphysical entities. Instead, the absolute inner value or dignity is a property human beings have to attribute to each other and to themselves on the basis of a reflexive argument. To show this, Kant's theory of the self-reflexivity of pure practical reason is recapitulated. Kant's argument is then compared to the somewhat alternative reflexive argument offered by Alan Gewirth.
