ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the topic of moral responsibility. It proposes a novel externalist account of moral responsibility linked to power relationships. Specifically, it proposes that in addition to the causing of harm, the most important element for moral responsibility attributions is power. The idea that power matters to moral responsibility is not developed much in moral philosophy. Recent work by Reis-Dennis on resentment nevertheless makes the intuition apparent. Therefore, after showing that the basis of an externalist perspective can be found in Strawson, this chapter explores Reis-Dennis’ “ecological view of resentment,” which gives a central role to power. However, because this chapter assumes that resentment cannot ground moral responsibility, it departs from Reis-Dennis’ framework and instead proposes a new account, via the idea of role responsibility, for how power matters to moral responsibility. The following sufficient conditions for attributing moral responsibility to an agent for some bad outcome are ultimately suggested: (i) the agent was in a position of power relative to the victim at the moment of the action that gave rise to that outcome; (ii) the agent's position of power created a relationship of responsibility toward the victim; and (iii) the agent failed to meet the demand placed on her by that relationship of responsibility with respect to that outcome.
