ABSTRACT
This chapter illuminates the changes and continuities in Finnish-Russian relations after the start of Russia’s invasion against Ukraine in 2022. It argues that despite the seemingly radical changes in Finnish foreign and security policy after February 2022, there is more continuity in Finnish policies than meets the eye. The chapter argues that from the Finnish perspective, its relations with Russia are about managing three intertwined dilemmas: the security dilemma between the West and Russia, the asymmetry dilemma between Finland and Russia, and the broader small state dilemma within the international system. For many years, Finland managed this security dilemma by being neutral and subsequently militarily non-aligned, by maintaining good working relations with Russia, and by deepening cooperation with the Nordic states, the United States and NATO. This calculus eventually changed as a result of several issues: first, the increasing geopolitical competition and weakening of the rules-based international order; second, Russia’s evolution into a revisionist state that aims to rewrite the rules of the European security order; and third, Russia’s internal development that gives little cause for optimism about the future trajectory of the country. After the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Finland considered NATO membership as the best available option to manage the key dilemmas. NATO membership does not set free Finland from Russia-related dilemmas; rather, it provides a new framework to manage the relationship. Even as a NATO member, Finland aims to protect the agency and security of small states within the European security order with its pragmatic and active foreign and security policy.
