ABSTRACT
This chapter critically examines the assumptions underlying the debate on the natural origins of conceptual content, with a focus on the neo-Pragmatist frameworks of Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Responding to recent critiques—particularly those advanced by Hutto and Satne—we argue that these critiques rest on a misreading of neo-Pragmatism’s aims and commitments. First, we clarify that neo-Pragmatism does not rely on a single conception of intentionality, and that non-discursive, non-contentful forms of intentionality remain available within its framework. We contend that the notion of “Ur-intentionality” adds little to this picture, serving merely as a restatement of familiar ideas. We then reconstruct Brandom’s and McDowell’s accounts of conceptual content, emphasizing their focus on immanent normative structures rather than chronological or empirical origins. Against accusations of causal circularity, we defend the coherence of linking conceptual content to communal practices by distinguishing between constitutive and historical explanations. In doing so, we aim to clarify the philosophical relevance of the question and to dispel certain conceptual confusions that have generated unnecessary philosophical anxieties.
