ABSTRACT

This chapter argues that both history and law, being generally crafts employing productive knowledge (poiesis), should encourage their professionals to develop also “practical knowledge” (phronesis). The difference between poiesis and phronesis is discussed in the context of Aristotle's practical philosophy (Nicomachean Ethics, Politics) and his aesthetics (Poetics). Arguments for introducing phronesis into the field of law are provided. It is emphasised that phronesis (translated into Latin as prudentia) involves internal limitations on action, guiding experts in some areas (including lawyers) to act in ways that embody universal human values (justice, equality, freedom). Equally important are temporal aspects of this kind of practical knowledge, which are briefly discussed with the help of two symbolic representations of phronesis-prudentia: Titian's Allegory of Prudence and Cesare Ripa's description from his Iconology. The relevance of history in understanding and guiding human actions in a complex and value-oriented world of human affairs is defended. Ultimately, it is suggested that the legal curriculum should balance the knowledge of law with ethical engagement to promote a more humane and adaptable legal practice, which means that history deserves to be recognised as a source of practical wisdom that should be part of legal education.