ABSTRACT
As Russia's war in Ukraine barrels on and North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) philosophy of deterrence has been eroded by the caprice of the Trump administration, Europe is ramping up its defence spending to shore up its strategic autonomy. By working through the European Union (EU) institutions, member states aim to stimulate joint procurement and production. Simultaneously, the Union is promoting an “open architecture combined with variable geometry” in security and defence. This caters not just for a coalition of the willing to provide forward defence in Ukraine, which is a precondition for the EU's own security. It is much more an invitation to like-minded countries to strike up defence partnerships with the EU and serve mutual strategic interests. The condition for accelerated defence industrial integration into the Single Market and access to the new defence funds is that partner countries share the same strategic outlook as the EU. As the EU re-arms, some candidate countries will have to bite the bullet and show that they're on the same side, i.e. with the EU and against Russia. This chapter argues that alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been elevated to the level of the fundamentals for EU membership.
