ABSTRACT
Several formal models of awareness have been introduced in both computer science and economics literature as a solution to the problem of logical omniscience. In this chapter, I provide a philosophical discussion of awareness logic, showing that its underlying intuition appears already in the seminal work of Hintikka. Furthermore, I show that the same intuition is pivotal in Newell’s account of agency, and that it can be accommodated in Levi’s distinction between epistemic commitment and performance. In the second part of the chapter, I propose and investigate a first-order extension of Fagin and Halpern’s Logic of General Awareness, tackling the problem of representing “awareness of unawareness”. The language is interpreted over neighborhood structures, following the work of Arl´o-Costa and Pacuit on First-Order Classical Modal Logic. Adapting existing techniques, I furthermore prove that there exist useful decidable fragments of quantified logic of awareness.
