The British Military Withdrawal from Singapore and the Anatomy of a Catalyst

“It was not even a sell-out: it was a handout, with virtually nothing demanded or even bargained for in return”, an angry Arthur de la Mare, the former British High Commissioner in Singapore, wrote to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in November 1971. De la Mare was reflecting on the handover of the British military bases to the Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) government between 1968 and the end of December, when the remaining British forces would depart from Britain’s chief base in Southeast Asia. ¹ De la Mare castigated his colleagues for conceding the bases to Singapore without retaining a say in their deployment for economic purposes. With more than a tinge of regret, he lamented, “Had we so wished we had the opportunity not only to retain all that we needed but also to transform Singapore from a doubtful military bastion (it was never a very good one) into the forward base of British business and commerce in East Asia”. ² It was a scathing comment on the end of Singapore’s role in the British Empire.