Why did it take so long until a successful reform changed the institutional setting of budgetary politics and reduced the level of conﬂict? In this chapter, I will analyse the stability of the institutional path initiated by the 1970 treaty, and identify the factors that triggered institutional change 15 years later.1 In line with the propositions introduced in Chapter 8, I contend that a combination of reproduction mechanisms cemented the original institutional setting. The bargaining power of the enacting coalition, the interdependence of different subfields of budgetary politics and high switching costs contained pressure for change and prevented major reforms for a long period. Only as the change coalition gained bargaining power, linkages between the subﬁelds were drawn and the opportunity costs of continuing with the existing setting signiﬁcantly increased, the reproduction mechanisms lost force and institutional change occurred. Moreover, pressure for change had accumulated because the institutional setting failed to accommodate demands for change in small on-path changes.