ABSTRACT
The 2002/2003 Iraq crisis is the first of two case studies used for the analysis of justification as a practice of normative ordering in the United Nations Security Council. Its relevance stems from the fact that this crisis called into question the Council’s key role in enforcing a system of collective security provided by the United Nations. During the Iraq crisis, the opting out of two permanent Council members from this system raised a normative controversy regarding the Council’s role as the sole authority for the use of force. The chapter is structured along three analytical steps, each subsequently narrowing the scope of analysis. The chapter starts with a discussion of how and why the Iraq crisis constitutes a normative controversy about Security Council responsibility. It then applies a text analysis of all public Council meeting records during the controversy, revealing the variety of possible principles of worth related to responsibility and closes with a micro-level analysis of the infamous 4701st meeting on 5 February 2003. During this meeting, US Secretary of State Colin Powell presented evidence about a supposed Iraqi breach of its obligations. The meeting is used to demonstrate how actors apply tests of their underlying normative orders and, in doing so, engage in practices of normative ordering.
