ABSTRACT
This chapter assesses a number of combinations of naturalistic hypotheses which have been suggested in recent literature. I argue that these and other possible combinations fail in light of the considerations established in previous chapters. For example, while in some cases an isolated suspect of a murder may suffer from faulty memory under the influence of protracted and suggestive interrogations by others (as Philipse mentions), in the case of Jesus’ resurrection the disciples could have checked with one another whether they did see anything together and remembered correctly what they ‘saw,’ if someone among them were to enforce or reinforce any idea. Sceptic have cited examples of cognitive dissonance in religious sects, the most striking of which is the case of the Rebbe Menachem Schneersohn (1902–1994), some of whose followers claim his ‘resurrection’. However, unlike the case of Jesus, there is absence of a tradition of a well-defined series of resurrection appearances of the Rebbe and the belief that the Rebbe is resurrected or divine is not widely held by the leaders of his followers. On the contrary, many of them acknowledge that he did not resurrect and are still awaiting his resurrection from his tomb.
