ABSTRACT
In asymmetric bargaining, a weaker state might gain leverage by playing one major power against another. “Donor switching” is the process of shopping around among donors, looking for foreign funding with the least conditionality. During the Cold war, states can threaten to defect between the Western and the Soviet Bloc. Now, states can align out of the US orbit and into the Chinese one. The theory implies that donor switching backfires on the recipient when the alternative patron as a rational actor increases its demands on the prospective client. The chapter illustrate this claim with a case study of the aid dynamic between Myanmar and competing donors, the US and China. Myanmar is neither a primary nor secondary recipient. It represents a case of a recipient with intermediate salience. Under Western sanctions, Myanmar relies on Chinese patronage. Recognizing its increased leverage, China increased its demands on Myanmar over time. Excessive Chinese demands made American pressure to politically liberalize more palatable to the Burmese junta. The alternative account of a bottom-led transition is addressed and refuted. The political transition occurred despite the rational incentive of the authoritarian recipient to donor switch. Donor switching has it limits.
