ABSTRACT
In this chapter, it is argued that the intuitive and ontological virtues of counterfactual theories of causation (CTCS) are exaggerated. First, contrary to what proponents of CTCS assume, tradition actually dictates that causation explains counterfactual dependence rather than the other way around. It is part and parcel of the standard view that effects are counterfactually dependent on their causes. This fact is rarely, if ever, addressed by proponents of CTCS. Second, ontologies according to which the world develops in determinate ways because of substantial connections of some kind—for instance, Platonic laws, natural laws, or powers—have no use for counterfactual theories (even though they may possibly find talk of possible worlds a useful heuristic). Finally, and more surprisingly, Humean metaphysics is ill-suited to ground the truth of causal claims on the truth of counterfactual claims. If reality really is contingent, there is nothing about any world that prohibits two near-duplicate worlds to differ only in the respect that makes a given counterfactual false.
