ABSTRACT
In the 20th century, philosophy has favoured the neo-Humean view that there are no substantial connections in nature. The 21st century has seen a revival of causal realism and opposition to neo-Humeanism. This book is a constructively critical discussion of the realist revival. It is critical because it aims to show (i) that contemporary realists often inadvertently incorporate into their accounts of causation certain ideas that really belong to the neo-Humean framework they object to, (ii) that the incorporation of these neo-Humean ideas are an obstacle to the further development of causal realism, and (iii) that some of the Aristotelian components that causal realists are seeking to revive are arguably incompatible with the theories and findings of modern science; in other words, they are falsified by science. The book is constructive in that it suggests a way to avoid the fallacies involved in (i)–(iii) to arrive at a modified powerful particulars view that is compatible with modern science. In this chapter the author briefly sets the stage for the discussion, introducing the relevant competing views and central concepts.
