ABSTRACT
Substance and process ontologies are typically construed as complete opposites. In this chapter it is argued that contemporary process ontologists are primarily in opposition to what is identified as the modern analytic view of substance, which is the brain-child of the neo-Humean framework, but not obviously in opposition to the Aristotelian view of substance. It is argued that a process ontology that frames itself in perfect opposition to the Aristotelian view, in particular by denying any common constituent that underlies the distinct stages of a process, is one that can only make sense of change either as variation between temporal parts, the view taken by neo-Humean substance ontologists, or in terms of absolute becoming; which is a becoming that violates the idea that everything has a natural origin. Finally, it is argued that the author’s account of compound entities as unities of interacting parts represents such compound objects as entities for which change is essential for their continued existence, and that they are therefore processes while still being substances in the way dictated by the Aristotelian tradition.
