ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author elaborates and defends a normative theory for regulating the individual’s relationship between her diachronic selves (i.e., her earlier and later selves): the Moral Theory of Prudence in diachronic self-regarding decisions. The theory consists of three principles. The first is the present self’s obligation to preserve the future self’s agency, which requires one’s present self to avoid choices jeopardizing the necessary conditions for the pursuit of any set of normative principles of action. The second is the future self’s right to an open present, which is the future self’s claim to pursue her set of normative principles. The third is forward-looking self-regarding responsibility, which is the present self’s responsibility to the future self for the present self’s predictable effects of her actions on the future self.
The author discusses current approaches to diachronic self-regarding decisions and shows three differences between these approaches and the Moral Theory of Prudence. First, the latter is based on the agency, rather than the well-being, of a person’s diachronic selves. Second, it interprets diachronic self-regarding decisions as interagential (i.e., decisions between two agents), rather than reading them as interpersonal or intrapersonal. Third, it adopts a realistic and empirically plausible, rather than idealized, model of the agent.
