ABSTRACT
Globally, policy development for pandemic preparedness involves key stakeholders who should jointly devise ways, reflecting past experiences in dealing with virulent epidemics and investment of resources to tackle anticipated health threats. Imageries often portray benevolent strategists with a unified objective of tackling and saving lives during an epidemic. This chapter offers contrary evidence and analysis. It shows that despite the 14 months of policy preparedness against Ebola and the enormity of resources invested, Frontline Health Workers (FRHWS) lacked sufficient Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and risk allowance payments. Also, the Ebola case surveillance period was reduced to 8 days from 21 days due to dire working conditions. This chapter shows how policy preparedness is differentially shaped by hierarchies of knowledge, biopolitics and decision-making processes. Indeed, the overarching agenda for managing common health threats and making necessary plans to minimise epidemics’ negative impacts is only secondary.
