ABSTRACT
Merger and state aid policies are a frequent source of disagreement between national and supranational competition authorities regarding the balance between market competition and industrial competitiveness. To ascertain which goal takes precedence in practice, Chapter 3 first analyses selected merger cases in three politically sensitive sectors: motor vehicles, rail transport, and energy. The disallowance of the proposed Volvo/Scania and Siemens/Alstom mergers in 2000 and 2019 suggests that the European Commission prioritises the maintenance of market competition rather than the creation of larger EU firms. This does not necessarily mean that the European Commission is more hostile than member states to all types of mergers. As the E.ON/Endesa case (2006) illustrates, the European Commission generally promotes cross-border mergers and confronts member states that try to protect their large domestic firms from foreign capital. An analysis of state aid control offers more nuanced insights. After the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, EU state aid rules were temporarily relaxed. Subsequently, the European Commission once again began to ensure strict law enforcement and tackled the issue of tax rulings. However, the ongoing outbreak of COVID-19 posed one of the biggest challenges to EU state aid control.
