ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates whether EU competition policy discriminates against non-EU firms through an analysis of quantitative data and controversial cases that involved non-EU firms from the 1990s to the 2010s. The analysis focuses on three policy areas: cartels, abuse of dominance, and mergers. The case studies include the vitamins cartel, the TV and computer monitor tubes cartel, Microsoft (interoperability and tying), Google (online shopping, Android mobile devices, and online advertising), and the proposed General Electric/Honeywell merger. To provide balanced arguments, this chapter engages with discussions about EU competition policy in Japan and the United States. While the European Commission's competition decisions are sometimes criticised for their lack of rigorous economic and legal assessments, the analysis in this chapter shows that there is no clear evidence of systematic discrimination against non-EU firms. The European Commission is tough on all firms, regardless of their country of origin. This is most likely because, as suggested in Chapter 1, the main goal of EU competition policy is the maintenance of market competition rather than the direct creation and strengthening of dominant EU firms.
