ABSTRACT
This chapter describes the functioning of a trading green-power certificates (TGC) experiment during the period 2001-2007, as a learning source for officials then elaborating and testing EU's emissions trading systems. In 2001, the EU adopted a directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources. The chapter discusses Flanders market construct for Tradable Green Certificates. It also reports salient results delivered by the Flemish TGC system, for example, relatively huge money transfers across groups in the regulated constituency. TGC’s deliberate neglect of actual physical and institutional diversities leads to unjustified excess profits and unfair cash transfers. Target fetishism had a high price in environmental costs and in higher bills for electricity consumers. Innovation requires strategic vision on the state and future of the renewable energy sector. Notwithstanding the clear lessons, discussed in scientific reports, the European Commission adhered to artificially set-up markets. Finally, the chapter presents some conclusions.
