ABSTRACT
This chapter introduces some of the main concepts that enable an investigation into the epistemic harms caused or constituted by genocide denialism. It aims to establish a normative basis for the claim that genocide denialism generates and sustains epistemically pernicious ignorance. The chapter first outlines Fricker’s theory of epistemic injustice, specifically her basic forms of systematic discriminatory epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice, and hermeneutical injustice. It then complements this with the form of epistemic injustice that Pohlhaus Jr calls wilful hermeneutical ignorance. The chapter also discusses some of the relevant key objections and proposed amendments to Fricker’s central cases of epistemic injustice. Moreover, the chapter introduces an account of epistemic injustice centred around epistemic domination and oppression to highlight the institutional and social enabling conditions of epistemic injustice. It concludes that an institutional context characterized by genocide denialism promotes and sustains conditions in which members of the target group are epistemically oppressed.
