ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that genocide denialism constitutes hermeneutical oppression by unjustly constraining members of the target group from participating in relevant social practices of meaning-making, namely the collective endeavour of giving meaning to the past. The chapter first discusses some of the relevant functions and values of collective memory, specifically genocide remembrance. To argue for its epistemic value, the chapter introduces Sue Campbell’s reconstructive account of memory, according to which we can think of genocide remembrance as a complex ethical/epistemological achievement. Given the epistemic value of genocide remembrance, the chapter also offers an account of genocide denialism as a case of wilful hermeneutical ignorance. Denialism signifies a disrespectful challenge to rememberers. It distorts hermeneutical resources and thereby constitutes hermeneutical oppression in three ways: (1) introducing a problematic definition of the concept of genocide, (2) introducing the notion of “just memory”, and (3) promoting misconceptions about historiographical research. The capacity to testify to the past constitutes us as rememberers. The chapter therefore ends by discussing how hermeneutical oppression relates to, and is reinforced by, testimonial oppression. It also identifies the concomitant primary and secondary harms.
