ABSTRACT

Japan’s is a bellwether case, for so little of Stalin’s true intentions with regard to Japan have been analyzed. One can observe a difference in Stalin’s treatment of Japan even when compared to other capitalist countries. In most cases, the Soviet government, including the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, was familiar with Stalin’s policy orientation. Russia’s lack of interest in the Manchurian economy had made it difficult to use local resources in the war. Russia’s prejudice and ignorance had led to transporting everything from its western regions to Manchuria to fight the war. By releasing the Tanaka Memorial in 1929 to the Chinese, Moscow pursued a clear political objective: to present Japan as the aggressor against China. In the two-three years since 1926–27, the political situation in China had changed significantly. In Komoto Daisaku, Stalin had already found one useful source. Having conspired with the Soviet Union to assassinate Zhang Zuolin, Komoto was an ideal person for developing Stalin’s plans.