ABSTRACT
In situationist literature, legalism, antinomianism and situation ethics (situationism) may denote the decision-making methods or their rationale, as presented in the previous chapter. This chapter discusses the normative assumptions that specify these practices, as outlined by Fletcher. The first section explores the meta-views associated with legalism, including theories concerning natural and scriptural laws, and examines how they interpret moral value. The chapter discusses the notion of normative universalism and its significance in legalistic ethics, emphasising the difficulties and inconsistencies it poses in moral quandaries. Additionally, it analyses the contrast between obedience and compassion in legalistic ethics and the resulting consequences for moral decision-making. The subsequent section redirects its attention towards antinomianism, employing Jean-Paul Sartre's early philosophy as a prominent illustration. The text explores Sartre's philosophical concepts of nominalism and normative particularism, focusing on the existentialist viewpoint of the process of creating value and making decisions. The text examines the concept of normative decisionism, emphasising its key role in antinomian ethics. The last section of the chapter explores the metatheory of situation ethics, specifically addressing Fletcher's concept of principled relativism and agapism. This text explores the notion of love as a fundamental ethical obligation and its significance in determining moral responsibilities within the framework of situation ethics. The chapter also examines utilitarianism, specifically investigating the principle of optimisation and rule utilitarianism in the context of situation ethics. Furthermore, it examines Fletcher's embrace of pragmatism and its consequences for the theory of meaning and goals in ethics.
