ABSTRACT
After authorities noticed the omissions and flaws of the pre-crisis framework, they took action. In this chapter, G-SIB-oriented regulation both at international (BCBS, FSB) and regional (US and EU) levels is presented. Every aspect is analyzed separately in detail, encompassing changes in the supervisory institutional frameworks, designation, G-SIB capital buffer, leverage ratio, large exposure limits, resolution, and Pillar 2. Special attention is devoted to two overarching issues. First, it is carefully examined whether these binding regimes are adequately tailored and do not replicate the generalizing tendencies of the pre-crisis rules. Second, each regulatory field is analyzed from the perspective of supervisory discretion granted within its scope, as such powers allow for the adjustment of overly general rules. The conclusion is that the currently binding US and EU frameworks still do not adequately reflect the individual features of G-SIBs, but luckily in almost every one of these areas broad discretion is at the regulators’ disposal and they are able to repair this flaw.
