ABSTRACT
In a desperate attempt to buck the tide of polarization by linking the key partners of the United States and China, Abe Shinzo’s overtures to Vladimir Putin came despite a sharp deterioration in Russo-US relations. They were an indicator of Russian seriousness about multipolarity in its “Turn to the East,” and Japan’s search to avoid Sinocentric regionalism. If Abe thought that he was wooing a pragmatic Putin, focused on economic uplift of the Russian Far East or balance against China, Putin’s identity obsession and security designs overwhelmed his plan. Putin treated Japan as a security appendage of Washington, leaving doubt that compromise would be compatible with the glorification of World War II, focusing only on China, and vilifying the threat from US alliances. The national identity gap between Tokyo and Moscow remained the bane of their relationship, interfering with acting on economic complementarity. Moscow prizes military prowess, looking down on Japan. If Japan played down images of Russian human rights abuses and aggression, Russia attacked Japan for trying to overturn the results of the war, widening the identity gap. Post-Abe, Russia doubled down on warning Japan of the worst to come, and Japan became more forthright about Putin’s ways. Crossing boundaries had proven to be an unrealizable objective. The Ukraine war finally left this relationship in free fall.
