ABSTRACT
Consciousness of the Grand Strategic Triangle of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States peaked in the 1970s–80s, but Russia is pressing for its revival. No triangle matters more for global security and the future of the international system. The forces drawing Russia and China together have been underestimated, both in a bilateral context and in a triangular framework consistently meaningful to both Moscow and Beijing. Whether because of national identity congruence or complementarity in their struggles for spheres of influence distant from each other, they are rather immovable by US policies. Within East Asia, Russia’s determination to assert its influence has raised this triangle’s profile as well, but that did not rule out signs of tension in Sino-Russian relations on security, economic, and national identity dimensions. As Russocentrism intensified with the West as its target, reviving Soviet anti-imperialist narratives, Sinocentrism focused on the United States and its partners in Asia. This leaves Russia less able to balance China in Asia, a price it has accepted, Despite tensions over regional architecture, the Sino-Russian marriage is secure at the triangular level, fueled by security and identity obsessions. It took a leap forward as parallel plans advanced to challenge the US-led order in their regions.
