ABSTRACT
The ROK-Japan-US triangle is an unrealized but incipient three-way alliance. It has fallen short of its potential due to the ROK-Japan leg and South Korea’s hesitancy to satisfy US requests to do more with Japan. To strengthen the US presence in East Asia, high on the agenda is working more closely with the two allies as the backbone of a US-led community. The Japan-ROK leg of the triangle suffered a setback when the “comfort women” agreement was repudiated in Seoul and a court demanded that Japanese firms pay restitution to Korean forced labor, which Japan took as a violation of the normalization of 1965. Under Joe Biden, the US-Japan security consensus hardened on the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the defense of Taiwan. Seoul was on the outside, but wishful thinking on Sino-US relations and North Korean aims could give way to acceptance of security triangularity. Washington may make decoupling requests hard for Seoul to refuse, even if Beijing imposes tough economic sanctions. Bipolarity raises many challenges, but Seoul’s options have narrowed. Progressives desperately tried to salvage North Korea–centered diplomacy to no avail. Conservatives were ready to tilt decisively to the United States. These are positive signs for closer trilateralism subject to far-sighted leadership.
