ABSTRACT
The following chapter analyses the early development of energy policy, starting from the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community up to the 1970s. It highlights the impasse the European Communities found themselves in during this period, as national interests primarily guided the energy sector. Although many ambitious goals were set, various legislative proposals were staunchly blocked by Member States that did not want to relinquish control over their respective energy policies. This chapter also demonstrates that even in the light of the first oil crisis of 1973/74 – which theoretically could have served as a critical juncture – a common energy policy and solidarity amongst Member States did not materialise due to the institutional design. Preferences were informed by rational strategic decisions based on self-interested calculations and utilitarian considerations. Reasoned through Scharpf’s joint decision trap and the requirement of unanimity in the Council, it also shows that institutional stickiness was high, locking the Communities into a highly ineffective institutional path. Veto players’ influence on decision-making forestalled any institutional development. In the absence of delegated powers and a shared vision of the institutional design, attempts to tackle salient issues faltered, even though pro forma agreements were previously reached.
