ABSTRACT
This chapter provides an overall framework for conceptualizing PRC maritime gray zone operations. Referencing relevant history and the key aspects of existing frameworks, the chapter explains why these existing frameworks fall short to properly explain what China’s gray zone activities are and what they are not. In doing so, the chapter validates the emerging theoretical and empirical discourse of gray zone operations as a distinct framework. China’s gray zone behavior is a combination of legal legerdemain and non-militarized coercion. Beijing carefully avoids overt military involvement, and portrays itself as abiding by the law and exercising legitimate jurisdiction and power in the maritime domain. In doing so, it aims to alter the status quo subtly by appearing to defend its claims, rather than employing force and thereby increasing the risk of escalation and outside involvement. Most fundamentally, to resolve claims in its favor while limiting opponents’ options to resist, China’s maritime gray zone operations take advantage of asymmetric capabilities and trade force for time. These approaches facilitate Beijing’s self-portrayal as an aggrieved defender. Further, PRC gray zone operations paradoxically impose the burden of escalation on the subjects of its predations, making it difficult for them to counter effectively.
