ABSTRACT
Germany has always played an outsized role in shaping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO’s) nuclear posture, most importantly in NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement. The concomitant institutional arrangements in which U.S. allies can shape NATO nuclear policy were a response to German fears of abandonment and entrapment. This chapter looks at Germany's nuclear strategy after the end of the Cold War and discusses how German leaders have responded to two far-reaching changes in Germany's nuclear security environment: the Zeitenwenden of 1989–1991 and 2014–2022. It argues that fears of abandonment and entrapment have continued to shape German nuclear policy, even though in slightly different forms. German leaders have tried to minimize nuclear risks, while avoiding questioning NATO as a nuclear alliance, thereby trying to square the circle between growing popular anti-nuclear sentiments and the multilateral reflex of German foreign policy. While the benign security environment of the post-Cold War era made it possible for successive German governments to pursue a relatively inexpensive “sowohl als auch” (as-well-as) policy, the new security environment forces Germany to reinvest in nuclear deterrence.
