ABSTRACT
This chapter introduces the concept of epistemic entitlement. It first argues that trust in hinge certainties cannot be justified in the ordinary ways, that is, either through evidence, a priori, through reliability, or dogmatically. Second, the chapter proposes Crispin Wright’s alternative account of the epistemic warrant that we can have for our hinges. It reconstructs and critically examines the arguments that Wright uses to establish how we are entitled to trust in our hinge presuppositions. It also compares Wright’s account to competing accounts of the epistemic status of our hinges, namely by Annalisa Coliva and Tyler Burge. Finally, the chapter presents a novel account of epistemic entitlement as entitlement of cognitive activity. This account is inspired by Wright’s concept of entitlement of cognitive project as well as Coliva’s account of extended rationality. Entitlement of cognitive activity is explained in detail and illustrated with the role it plays in philosophy.
