ABSTRACT
This chapter introduces two competing theories of epistemic virtue – virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. It shows that both cannot explain epistemic success on their own. However, the two theories both fail to explain the whole range of human epistemic success. This chapter presents a way to unify reliabilism and responsibilism under the roof of human cognition. More specifically, this chapter argues that reliabilist and responsibilist virtues are complementary. They are the excellence of different types of cognition. Cognitive psychologists argue that there are two types of cognition: Type 1 – fast, automatic, and heuristic – and Type 2 – slow, controlled, and deductive. This chapter shows that reliabilist virtues are Type 1 virtues and responsibilist virtues are Type 2 virtues. It also shows how these virtues function, and some of the theoretical benefits that we gain from this theory.
