ABSTRACT
This chapter bolsters the idea of blameworthiness for irrationality by arguing that irrationality can give rise to moral blameworthiness, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. The chapter starts out with the observation that many of our attitudes are non-culpable in the specific sense that there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding these attitudes. It then argues that we can still be morally blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes insofar as they’re irrational and cause moral harm. Such harmful irrationality can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. This argument provides a distinctive new challenge for Indirect Voluntarism. To explain moral blameworthiness for irrational attitudes, we must appeal to our direct responsiveness to right-kind reasons, and to the normative force of right-kind reasons.
