ABSTRACT
This chapter defends the normativity of epistemic rationality against the challenge from the last chapter. It first shows that the challenge is right in assuming that there must be such a thing as epistemic blame if epistemic reasons are normative. In reply to the challenge, the chapter then defends the possibility of epistemic blame, especially in cases of trivial belief (thus replying to the clutter avoidance problem) and in cases of epistemic-practical conflict. This reply shows that epistemic rationality has normative significance independently of practical reasons to make oneself epistemically rational, and that we are therefore directly responsible for complying with the requirements of epistemic rationality. This gives rise to a conception of epistemic rationality as an evaluative kind of normativity that matters for how we ought to relate to one another within our epistemic community. Based on this conception, it is argued (a) that this normativity is a genuine kind of normativity (despite being ‘merely evaluative’), (b) that epistemic and practical reasons cannot be weighed against each other to derive what one ‘ought’ to believe simpliciter when both kinds of reasons conflict, and (c) that our overall practice of epistemic evaluation nevertheless has pragmatic foundations.
