ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the argument from the last chapter is generalized: our evaluations of attitudes as (ir)rational imply that we are directly responsible for our attitudes, rather than merely for prior actions and omissions. It is argued that this gives rise to a plausible hybrid account of responsibility for attitudes that is rationalist in spirit, yet includes indirect voluntarist elements. The chapter first generalizes the challenge from Chapter 4 by applying it to right-kind reasons for desire, intention, and emotion. It then defends the normativity of right-kind reasons against this challenge by arguing that we are directly blameworthy for irrational attitudes: irrationality can impair our relationships in various ways, and it can warrant distinctive yet genuine blaming responses. The proposed hybrid view combines a rationalist account of mental responsibility with voluntarist elements: any view that attempts to ground blameworthiness for attitudes either only in reasons-responsiveness or only in indirect voluntary control faces counterexamples. The chapter also defends a kind of internalism or perspectivism about blameworthiness by discussing the infamous case of the “rational racist”, as discussed by Rima Basu.
