ABSTRACT
Since the truths of the philosopher and the person of ressentiment are openly polemical, they are more plausible than those of the priest, who plays the double role of polemicist and arbiter. This chapter begins by confronting the limits of the dialectic from Hegel to Žižek, insofar as their critique of ressentiment tends to prioritize the negation of the negation over negation. It then contrasts the inherently polemical notion of good sense, which is argued to not yet have been overcome even by Améry, with that of common sense. Drawing on the pragmatism of James, Whitehead, Arendt, Sloterdijk, Stiegler, and Stengers, the aim is to explore the conditions for achieving more coherence in the drama of ressentiment, such that our speech becomes as plausible as it is truthful. That is, such that it might trigger a cosmopolitical event. This entails the introduction of a new type of discourse on ressentiment – that of the diplomat who makes a shift from the (self-)critique of ressentiment to the care for its becomings. By contrasting the Hegelian dialectic with Leibniz’s account of damnation, the book concludes by identifying the risks in naming ressentiment, both for those who articulate it and for those it concerns.
