ABSTRACT
The rural poor in non-industrialized countries were both the majority of the world’s hungry people and important staple food producers, so it seemed reasonable to make them more productive through packages of high-yielding seed varieties, fertilizer, irrigation and pesticides. This built on a critique of the trickle-down theory and the green revolution. The new approach was based on the misconception that small peasants and sharecroppers were isolated subsistence farmers – 700–800 million people to be integrated into the world and national economies, transforming these. It became hegemonial during the world food crisis. Among its many supporters were the ‘World Bank’, the U.S. government, the FAO, most non-industrialized countries as well as leftist activists. Their motives varied: experts sought technical problem-solving, Cold War strategists to stabilize capitalism and local elites hoped for new resources. During an economic crisis with fierce international competition, the scheme could stimulate demand in industrial countries, though soon there were complications because of the energy crisis. Amended by the WHO’s basic needs strategy, the approach led to complex “integrated rural development” concepts. Since external ‘aid’ lacked the capacity for a fundamental impact, Northern politicians and developmentalists regarded state machineries in non-industrialized countries and their planning as decisive to optimize the rural allocation of resources.
