ABSTRACT
This chapter investigates the pursuit of multilateral nuclear disarmament over the course of the first decade following the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The bilateral arms control agreements concluded by the superpowers during the first half of the 1970s did little to convince the non-nuclear powers that the world was on a path to nuclear abolition. On the contrary, the SALT process seemed to further entrench the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, bringing the hierarchy between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ into sharper relief. The superpowers were also seen to be using their privileges as permanent co-chairs of the Geneva Conference to stall disarmament negotiations. By the mid-1970s, the regime complex arrived at a critical juncture. To maintain the recognition order that legitimised NPT, the nuclear-weapon states would have to prove their commitment to the disarmament agenda at the NPT review conference in 1975. But the conference fell way short of expectations, triggering a crisis of legitimacy. Disturbed by the lack of progress on disarmament, a coalition of non-nuclear powers instigated a process to radically reform the multilateral nuclear disarmament framework through a UN ‘special session’ on disarmament. The final document adopted at the 1978 conference ultimately provided for a range of institutional adaptations that successfully relegitimised the nuclear regime complex.
