ABSTRACT
According to standpoint theory, the value-free ideal of science is neither feasible nor desirable. The value-free ideal is not feasible because all scientific knowledge is socially situated in ways that are likely to imply tacit value judgments concerning concepts, theoretical frameworks, and background assumptions. It is not morally desirable because insofar as value judgments are inevitable in the core activities of scientific inquiry, they should be informed by egalitarian values such as non-discrimination, anti-racism, and anti-sexism. It is not epistemically desirable because the production of evidence should also be guided by egalitarian values to ensure that evidence is not suppressed or distorted by systemic relations of power. The social location of researchers as well as research participants is an epistemic resource which can generate novel evidence, interpretations of evidence, theoretical concepts, criticism of existing research, and scientific breakthroughs. The epistemic resources of marginalized social locations can be developed into standpoints which are collective achievements involving critical awareness and emancipatory epistemic goals.
Readers may also be interested in the Handbook chapters by Robyn Bluhm, Kevin C. Elliott, Kristen K. Intemann, and Inkeri Koskinen.
