ABSTRACT
Debates about the cogency of the value-free ideal (VFI) have been central to the contemporary literature on values and science. This chapter provides an overview of the major arguments that have been leveled against the VFI and concludes on the basis of those arguments that it is very difficult to maintain the VFI in its traditional form. It is possible that alternative characterizations of the VFI could be developed and defended, but any plausible characterization of the VFI would have to allow for values to play significant roles in scientific reasoning and practice. Thus, moving forward it seems more fruitful to focus on exploring the best ways to manage value influences in science responsibly rather than debating the VFI.
Readers may be interested in these Handbook chapters as well: Matthew J. Brown, “Recent Arguments for the Ideal of Value-Free Science”; Kristen K. Intemann, “Feminist Challenges to the Value-Free Ideal of Science”; Zina B. Ward, “What Does It Mean to Say that Science is Value-Laden?”.
