ABSTRACT
There are many types of criticism that can be made of individual emotions or types of emotions, discussed in the philosophical literature. Most of these do not cover what we would understand as unfairness. This chapter discusses the criticisms of unfittingness, inconsistency, as well as prudential and moral criticism of emotions. It presents four dimensions along which the discussed types of criticism differ from each other and from the notion of unfairness at interest. These are (1) the standard or norm the criticized emotion falls short of; (2) the target of criticism; (3) the normative force invoked by the criticism; and (4) whether there is special standing involved. On its face, the criticism of unfairness invokes a moral standard that targets the emotion in light of the subject’s underlying attitudes that it invokes some normative force on the subject and is made on behalf of the targeted person, who has special standing in the matter. None of the other discussed types of criticism match all these four criteria.
